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Introduction  
 
The presence of sanguinary civil wars and religious and separatist conflicts 
afflicting several countries in the Middle East and northern Africa has led, 
especially over the past five years, to what has been called in Europe as the 
‘refugee crisis’, with southern European countries daily receiving increas-
ing numbers of re-settlers. It was estimated that over one million people – 
refugees, displaced persons and other migrants – have made their way to 
the EU in 2015; more than 350.000 arrived via the Mediterranean Sea in 
2016 alone, and about 60.000 in the first half of 2017 (European Commis-
sion, 2017; UNHCR, 2017). Those arriving via sea are split almost evenly 
between Italy and Greece, with smaller numbers arriving in Malta, Cyprus, 
and Spain (IOM, 2017).  
 The arrival of migrants in southern European countries and their relo-
cation to other European Member States has often raised concerns and 
sparked the protests of sections of the population. As a result, in many EU 
countries tighter control systems have been introduced against the alleg-
edly risk-posing ‘non-citizens’: namely undocumented migrants, asylum 
seekers and refugees. In Italy, these control systems have mostly relied on 
                                                          
1  Anna Di Ronco is Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Essex, UK. 
Anita Lavorgna is Associate Professor of Criminology at the University of 
Southampton, UK. 
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administrative, rather than on criminal, measures, and have been included 
in both security (public order) and migration control policies.   
 In Italy, right-wing political parties (particularly, but not limited to, the 
Northern League) have raised concerns over the arrival and presence of 
refugees and, more in general, migrants in Italian cities, often using a racist 
and xenophobic language that has legitimised ‘local policies of exclusion’ 
(Ambrosini and Caneva, 2012; Caneva, 2014). As will be detailed in the 
next section, these policies or public order regulations have been used by 
local authorities to administratively sanction and ban from public spaces 
all behaviour considered to be a ‘threat’ to the safety and security of citi-
zens, including begging, illegal settlements in public spaces (Roma peo-
ple), the selling and purchasing of alcoholic beverages and the presence of 
street prostitutes in certain city areas. In practice, however, these punitive 
regulations have mostly been applied against migrants (Caneva, 2014; 
Crocitti and Selmini, 2016), particularly Roma people and street sex work-
ers (who in Italy are mostly migrants; for more see Di Ronco, 2017). 
 Research has highlighted that there are differences in the local enforce-
ment of these public order regulations (Di Ronco, 2014, 2016) and that 
these differences are also related to the specific political parties entrusted 
with the local governance (Devroe et al., 2016). The use of onerous admin-
istrative or civil measures, which substantially restrict individual’s auton-
omy and de facto criminalise an individual’s behaviour and exclude un-
wanted and already marginalised groups from public spaces (which has 
occurred not only in Italy but also in other European countries, see Peršak, 
2017a), has been viewed as an example of popular punitiveness and pro-
tection of the public from feeling negative emotions (Peršak, 2017b). This 
misuse of measures has also been interpreted as a feature of the pre-crime 
society (Pleysier, 2015, 2017) and of Garland’s (2001) ‘culture of control’ 
(Devroe, 2012; Devroe et al., 2016).  
 Another broadly used control system (harshly criticised as contravening 
international human rights standards) is administrative detention – that is, 
the practice of detaining migrants for administrative purposes, such as to 
establish their identities, or to facilitate their immigration claims resolution 
or their removal (for a comparative study of the refugee detention systems 
in the US, UK, Italy, France and Germany, see Welch and Shuster, 2005). 
These detention systems have been studied in migration (Cinalli and El 
Hariri, 2011) and in the so-called ‘crimmigration’ literature (Guia et al., 
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2011; Van der Woude et al., 2017), and have been analysed through Gar-
land’s (2001) ‘culture of control’ and Simon’s (2007) ‘governing through 
crime’ theoretical frameworks (see, among others, Welch and Shuster, 
2005; Bosworth, 2008; Bosworth and Guild, 2008). Within the crimmigra-
tion literature, studies have emphasised the importance of the local context 
in the understanding of migration control and, consequently, the (informal) 
inclusion or exclusion of migrants by the action of criminal justice actors 
(Fabini, 2017). 
 National as well as local punitive policy responses towards unwanted 
minorities also depend on the media representations of the ‘problems’ to 
be addressed (Chibnall, 1977; Hall, 1982; Ericson et al., 1991). According 
to a recent comparative study (Berry et al., 2015), for instance, asylum 
seekers and refugees have been represented differently in Italian, Spanish, 
British and Swedish press outlets in 2014 and 2015. While the Swedish 
press has offered the most favourable and positive portrayal of asylum 
seekers and refugees, the British press has described them in the most neg-
ative terms: as a threat to the welfare and health systems (‘bogus’) and as 
criminals (Berry et al., 2015). Labelling asylum seekers and refugees as 
bogus and illegal facilitated a vicious circle of criminalisation (leading, for 
example, to their detention and electronic monitoring – which helped to 
reaffirm the idea that migrants are criminals) (Cooper, 2009). In the study 
of Berry and colleagues (2015), the Italian press produced mixed results: 
it included humanitarian themes along with negative frames, which are to 
be explained through the hostility and anti-migrant sentiments that since 
long have been promoted by politicians through the media, also with the 
use of stigmatising language and labels such as ‘clandestine’, ‘illegals’ etc. 
(Montaly et al., 2013; Quassoli, 2013).  
 These studies focused on the national press and offered, therefore, a 
national level of analysis. As suggested in the crimmigration literature, 
however, local approaches to (irregular) migrants may substantially vary 
across space and, in particular, in different local contexts. In addition to 
that, fear of crime and feelings of insecurity (which may, to an extent, be 
shared by people in Western societies and epitomise larger social anxieties) 
also very much vary in different local contexts (Girling et al., 2000; 
Jewkes, 2015) and may reflect the ideologies and discourses of the political 
parties running the city. In other words, the extent to which national puni-
tive regulations are implemented and enforced in a certain local context 
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may reflect local (political) narratives on the “problems” posed by mi-
grants, which are also voiced by local politicians (among other actors) 
through the local media.  
 The aim of this chapter is to inspect how the local press have framed 
the ‘problems’ associated with the increased presence of undocumented 
migrants, asylum seekers and refugees in two Italian cities, Padova and 
Udine, which have been run by different political parties: right-wing (Pa-
dova) and centre-left (Udine) parties. Ultimately, it aims to inspect whether 
there are similarities or differences in how the local press in these two cities 
has constructed the ‘problems’ posed by, and the solutions against, mi-
grants at the local level.  
 
 
Background: regulating asylum seekers and  
undocumented migrants in Italy 
 
Before moving to the media analysis, it is necessary to provide a brief over-
view of the complex Italian hosting system and the asylum claim process, 
and of the two main administrative control systems available in Italy to 
deal with the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ – i.e., administrative detention and 
public order measures (the latter take, in practice, the form of administra-
tive fines).2  
                                                          
2  In late September 2018, the Italian government has approved a new “security 
Decree” (which has to be converted into law by the Parliament within 60 day 
to retain its legal validity). This Decree would reduce the possibilities of issu-
ing residence permits to migrants for humanitarian reasons, and enlarge the 
types of crimes for which humanitarian protection is revoked or denied, lead-
ing to migrants’ deportation. These crimes are, among others, intimidation of 
a public officer, serious physical violence, and theft and burglary aggravated 
by the use of weapons or by the use of drugs by the perpetrator. It worth noting 
that, according to the new legislation, when a person is merely prosecuted (not 
convicted or found guilty) for one of these crimes, the asylum application can 
be blocked and the person immediately repatriated. This provision, as many 
commenters have already suggested, is in breach of the presumption of inno-
cence, which is crystallised in the Italian Constitution (art. 27). The Decree 
also revokes citizenship to people convicted for terrorism. In addition, it au-
thorises the local police (usually unarmed) to use taser guns and the police to 
access data bases; allows urban DASPOs (see the section of this chapter on 
public order measures) to be applied in healthcare facilities, markets and public 
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The hosting system and the asylum claim process 
 
Migrants and asylum seekers arriving it Italy are subject to a twofold host-
ing process. In the primary hosting phase (‘prima accoglienza’), migrants 
are gathered in Reception Centres (CDAs) and Hotspots3, where they are 
identified and divided into those who have to be repatriated as economic 
migrants and those with a right to apply for asylum. At least on paper, those 
with a right to apply for asylum should be tranferred to Regional Hubs 
(which since 2015 have replaced the so-called Hosting Centres for Asylum 
Seekers or CARAs). Those who have to be repatriated should be moved to 
the so-called Identification and Expulsion Centres (CIEs), soon to be re-
named Centers for Residence and Repatriation (CPR, see below for further 
details).  
 The asylum claim starts in the primary hosting phase either with a re-
quest at the border police office, or with the formal registration (including 
fingerprinting and photographing) at the Questura (provincial Police sta-
tion). Police authorities of the Questura ask the asylum seeker questions 
related to the Dublin III Regulation and then contact the Dublin Unit of the 
Ministry of the Interior to verify whether Italy is responsible for the exam-
ination of the asylum application. Police authorities cannot examine the 
merits of the asylum application, but they send the registration form and 
all the relevant documents to the Territorial Commissions for International 
Protection, which are competent for the substantive asylum interview. 
 In the secondary hosting phase (‘seconda accoglienza’), refugees and 
asylum seekers are moved into the Protection Systems for Asylum Seekers 
and Refugees (SPRARs) while waiting for a decision on their claim. In the 
SPRARs, asylum seekers and refugees should benefit from ad-hoc pro-
grams to facilitate their integration (such as Italian language courses and 
vocational education programs). Unfortunately, SPRARs are often unable 
to provide sufficient room for the high numbers of applicants, so that many 
                                                          
events; and sanctions squatting more harshly (with detention to up to four years 
and an administrative fine to be determined by the judge).      
3  The so-called ‘hotspots’, according to the approach developed by the EU Com-
mission, are the facilities set up at the EU’s external border in Italy (in Taranto, 
Trapani, Pozzallo and Lampedusa) and Greece for the initial reception, identi-
fication and registration of migrants coming by sea. 
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migrants are moved to the Extra Hosting Centres (CASs, similar to the 
Hubs) instead. 
 
Administrative detention 
 
In the Italian hosting system for migrants there are a number of adminis-
trative detention centres, originating from both Italian regulations and EU 
Directives that were only briefly mentioned in the previous section. This 
section aims at problematising the existence of the most controversial of 
these centers (those for identification and expulsion), and providing the 
necessary context to understand their development. 
 Immigration became an increasingly politicised issue from the late 
1980s, when Italy (historically a country of emigration) started to become 
a country of immigration. In 1998, the 40/1998 Immigration Act (‘Turco-
Napolitano Act’, after the names of the then Minister of Social Affairs 
Livia Turco and Minister of Interior Giorgio Napolitano) established, 
among others, an administrative immigration detention regime for irregu-
lar migrants who were to be identified before being expelled. The so-called 
Temporary Permanence Centres (CPTs), renamed in 2008 as Identification 
and Expulsion Centres (or CIEs) were regulated by the Prefectures (local 
divisions of the Ministry of Interior) and managed by private bodies funded 
with public money (initially, the Italian Red Cross and, currently, NGOs). 
CIEs, which were developed as an ‘emergency’ response, were criticised 
for grounds of unconstitutionality since their very inception, and especially 
after their regime was made harsher with the Immigration Act 189/2002 
(‘Bossi-Fini’) under Silvio Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition, and further 
amended by the so-called ‘Security Package’ (Law Decree 92/2008, con-
verted into Law 125/2008), Act 94/2009 and Decree 129/2011 (implement-
ing Directive 2008/115/EC on returning illegally staying third-country na-
tionals) (Sabatini, 2002; Vassallo Paleologo, 2010; Commissione Straor-
dinaria per la Tutela e la Promozione dei Diritti Umani, 2016).  
 Administrative detention and, essentially, penal restrictions in the CIEs 
were not based on the commission of a crime and imposed by a court at the 
end of a criminal proceeding (formally there are not ‘inmates’, but ‘guests’ 
[sic]). Rather, they were imposed by the Questore (the chief of the provin-
cial Police) and validated by a specialised judge with a deportation order 
or with a refused entry (Colombo, 2013). However, not all migrants who 
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were refused entry or were given a deportation order were detained in the 
CIEs, mostly because of their growing limited capacities. As contended by 
Colombo (2013), a crucial role in the decision on whether to detain a mi-
grant in a CIE was played by the police: among the considered criteria, 
there were the availability of beds, the likelihood of being repatriated, and 
previous criminal convictions. Initially, there were 13 CIEs (hosting about 
2.000 people), but were then formally reduced to five (in Roma, Caltanis-
setta, Bari, Torino, and Trapani), and could formally host a total of about 
550 people. However, additional temporary CIEs were created to respond 
to specific crisis (such as in Libya) leading to increasing numbers of refu-
gees, so that the actual number of CIEs swung often between 7 and 13, 
hosting about 1.000 people.  
 This legal framework for the regulation of asylum seekers and undocu-
mented migrants was changed in 2017 by a governmental Decree – the so-
called ‘Minniti-Orlando’, after the names of the then Ministry of the Inte-
riors Marco Minniti and the Ministry of Justice Andrea Orlando, in Premier 
Paolo Gentiloni's cabinet – on immigration and asylum (DL 13/2017), ap-
proved by the Italian Parliament on 12 April 2017. The Decree had the 
explicit aim to hasten the appeal procedures for asylum seekers, whose 
number severely increased over the last couple of years, causing severe 
delays in the (already clogged) Italian court system. Unfortunately, the De-
cree left the previous legislative paradigm – international migration as an 
‘emergency’ phenomenon to be repressed – unquestioned, and for this has 
been harshly criticised (Masera, 2017; Open Migration, 2017). In the name 
of simplifying judicial procedures and easing the burden of the reception 
system, asylum seekers will no longer have the chance to appeal in the 
second instance against the rejection of their claims. Furthermore, the ex-
amination phase changed from a summary proceeding to a full chamber 
proceeding, eliminating the need for a hearing; the judge will be now pro-
vided with a video recording of the asylum seeker’s interview before the 
Territorial Commission, and will be able to hear the claimant in person 
only at his/her discretion. These procedural changes have been harshly crit-
icised by the oppositions and civil society groups (Antigone, 2017; ASGI, 
2017; Open Migration, 2017). In addition, specialised sections in courts 
will be dedicated to asylum claims and deportations.  
 The CIEs will be renamed Centers for Residence and Repatriation 
(CPRs); their number will be expanded from 4 to 20 throughout Italy, and 
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their total capacity increased to 1.600 places. The CPRs will be smaller 
(not more than 100 persons each) and better managed than the CIEs, and 
they will have the clear purpose of repatriation (rather than reception). 
Some technical provisions of the Decree are expected to limit the right to 
asylum. For instance, the creation of a list of ‘safe’ origin and transit coun-
tries would probably imply that, if a person has transited through, or comes 
from, a ‘safe’ country (such as Turkey), the claimant has a very slim chance 
of being granted asylum (ASGI, 2017).  
 
Public order measures 
 
In 2008, when the so-called ‘Security Package’ (see above) was passed by 
the then Berlusconi government, local authorities have been allowed to 
sanction administratively any behaviour deemed to threaten public safety 
and security. Since then, local authorities, especially in the northern part of 
Italy (Cittalia, 2012), have substantially used this power to target a wide 
range of ‘threatening’ or, simply, uncivil behaviour, including begging, 
public drinking and drunkeness, vandalism, street prostitution (especially 
sex workers’ ‘indecent’ clothing, see Di Ronco, 2017), littering, and noise 
nuisance (Cittalia, 2009, 2012). A recent study (Crocitti and Selmini, 2016) 
has suggested that, although not explicitly, these local regulations have 
mostly targeted migrants, as beggars, street sex workers, squeegee mer-
chants etc. tend not to be of Italian nationality (see also Caneva, 2014).  
 The ‘Security Package’ and local security regulations have been nega-
tively assessed by the Constitutional Court in one of its leading judgments 
of 2011 (of 7 April, No 115). In this ruling, the Court found that national 
and local security regulations breached a number of constitutional princi-
ples, including the principles of legality and proportionality. In essence, 
the prohibited conduct was not clearly identified by the law (in violation 
of the legality principle), thus allowing local actors to virtually penalise 
any behaviour considered problematic or threatening people’s security 
with excessive measures (in breach of the proportionality principle). Ac-
cording to the Court, the penalisation of both harmful (and in many cases 
already criminalised behaviour, such as vandalism, which is often punished 
through the offence of criminal damage) and harmless conduct (such as the 
hanging about of young people on the streets, which may be harmless but 
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considered as alarming by some powerful social groups) resulted in an ex-
cessive and disproportionate interference with the exercise of individual’s 
rights. To realign the law to these fundamental constitutional principles, 
the Court ‘corrected’ the exercise of local public order powers: it allowed 
local authorities to adopt (temporary-limited) regulations only in excep-
tional cases of serious and concrete risks of harm to the public safety and 
security of people (Di Ronco and Peršak, 2014). Notwithstanding this 
judgment, local authorities have carried on issuing (illegitimate) local se-
curity orders (Caneva, 2014; Di Ronco and Peršak, 2014; Crocitti and Sel-
mini, 2016). 
 To make things worse, broad local public order powers have recently 
been re-introduced by the Italian government through the recent Law De-
cree 14/ 2017, which has been approved on the same day as the ‘Minniti-
Orlando’ decree referred to above and has the same nickname (‘Minniti’). 
The Decree, which violates the Constitutional Court’s ruling, allows mu-
nicipalities to, among others, adopt orders to protect the ‘decorum’, the 
‘urban liveability’ and the “peace and quiet of residents” (art. 8 co. 1 lett. 
a no 1), and to prevent behaviour that “favours the occurrence of criminal 
phenomena or illegality” (art. 8 co. 1 lett. B No 1). The use of very vague 
concepts in the Decree (such as ‘decorum’, ‘liveability’ etc.) may again 
lead to the penalisation of any possibly harmless yet unwanted behaviour, 
and, therefore, to excesses and abuses. 
 The Decree also gives the possibility to local authorities to ban people 
from certain city areas (mainly historical and touristic areas, and close to 
transport infrastructures) when they adopt behaviour that “impairs the ac-
cess and use of those areas” by others (art. 9 co. 1). These orders are infor-
mally called ‘urban DASPOs’, as they resemble the bans from taking part 
to sport events (the “Divieto di Accedere alle manifestazioni Sportive” or 
DASPO) used to exclude hooligans from sports events. People can be 
banned from a certain area for 48 hours; however, their access in the area 
can be prohibited by the Questore to up to six months, when they reiterate 
the prohibited conduct and adopt a behaviour that “may cause a risk to 
security” (art. 10 co. 2). Of course, the risk carried by this ban is that it will 
mostly be applied against, and ultimately exclude, the most vulnerable seg-
ments of the population (Antigone, 2017).  
 This ‘urban DASPO’ is relevant to the scope of our analysis: suffice it 
to think that it was used in an operation that took place in the Milan Central 
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Station on 2 May 2017, when dozens of migrants who hover/live around 
the train station where dispersed and 52 of them were brought in the Ques-
tura for inspection. The operation was severely criticised by many (e.g., 
activists from the civil society) but also praised by several politicians, such 
as Matteo Salvini of the Northern League (who thanked “God, the police, 
the carabinieri [for the] clean-up of this people we do not need [and who] 
every day infest [the station]”) (La Repubblica, 2017b). 
 
 
Methodology 
 
In this study, we chose to focus on two Italian cities, Padova and Udine, 
which are two medium-size cities located in the northeast of Italy. Their 
districts are relatively comparable in terms of economies,4 and they have a 
similar and rather high share of non-Italian residents compared to the total 
population.5 In addition, both Padova and Udine have hosting centres in 
their territories and have also implemented a number of public order 
measures. In Padova, for instance, under Bitonci’s administration, a num-
ber of public orders were issued in 2014, 2015 and 2016 to forbid, among 
others, rough sleeping on public benches, entering in certain recreation 
grounds without children, begging, soliciting of and procuring for prosti-
tution; they have also been issued to limit the opening hours of ‘Kebab 
shops’ in certain areas of the city (Padovanet, 2017). Udine adopted a local 
regulation to protect the urban ‘decorum’ by mostly targeting street sex 
workers, homeless people, drunk people and graffiti writers relatively re-
cently (on 20 December 2016).6   
                                                          
4  The average income (taxable income for the purpose of the personal income-
tax surcharge) in these two districts is € 21.155 and € 22.568, respectively (data 
from 2015, retrieved from www.comuni-italiani.it).  
5  In the Udine district migrants account to 7,5% of the total population (tot.: 
533.282), whereas in the Padova district they are 10% of the total population 
(tot.: 936.887). See www.comuni-italiani.it, as above. 
6  See: 
 http://www.comune.udine.gov.it/files/amministrazione_trasparente/dis-
posizioni_generali/atti/organizzazione/161219_regolamento_polizia_ur-
bana.pdf. 
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 Despite these similarities, these two cities strongly differ in terms of 
local politics. While Udine has firmly been under centre-left administra-
tions since 2003, Padova has shifted over the last decade between centre-
left and right wing (namely the regionalist and xenophobic Northern 
League) administrations; after the fall of the City Council ruled by Mas-
simo Bitonci from the Northern League in November 2016, it has been 
ruled by a prefectorial commissioner until November 2009.  New elections 
were held in Spring 2017 and won by a centre-left coalition led by Sergio 
Giordani (after a run-off with Bitonci). It will be interesting to see whether 
this will entail new patterns in the relationship between local politics and 
media representation of refugees and security issues.  
 
 
 
This study focuses on news articles published between 1 January, 2008 and 
31 May, 2017. We decided to start our analysis in January 2008, the year 
of the ‘Security Package’, which introduces tough crimmigration and pub-
lic disorder measures. The end date (31 May, 2017) is the latest possible 
date we could chose to complete the analysis.  
 The articles were extracted from the two most read newspapers in Pa-
dova and Udine, among the newspapers with a clear local focus which are 
Il Mattino di Padova and Il Messaggero Veneto- Giornale del Friuli, re-
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spectively.7 Both newspapers used the same online platform for their digi-
tal archives, which allowed us to use the same keyword searches: “(rifug-
iato OR rifugiata OR rifugiati OR rifugiate OR profugo OR profuga OR 
profughe OR profughi) AND (sicurezza OR criminale OR illegale)”. We 
considered articles published both online and on paper. Other keywords 
combinations could have been used. However, we carried out a pilot search 
and concluded that the selected searches provided a good balance between 
relevance and inclusiveness.  
 After having manually sorted the files to exclude non-relevant news and 
duplicates (see Tables 1 & 2), a final sample of 252 articles was obtained: 
152 were retrieved from Il Mattino di Padova (henceforth: MP) and 100 
from Il Messaggero Veneto-Giornale del Friuli (henceforth: MV). It is 
worth noting that we considered relevant only the news focusing on the 
local ‘impact’ of migrants (which means that, for instance, articles on mi-
gration in general, articles on refugees moving to other European countries 
such as Germany, or articles on events occurring in neighbouring cities 
such as Venezia or Pordenone were not taken into consideration for the 
analysis). 
 
  
                                                          
7  According to the data of Accreditamenti Diffusione Stampa [Press Diffusion 
Accreditation], retrievable from: http://www.adsnotizie.it/certif/index.php. 
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Tables 1 and 2 – Keyword searches 
Il Mattino di Padova 
 rifugiato 
(refugee 
– m) 
rifugiata 
(refugee 
– f) 
rifug-
iati 
(refu-
gees – 
m)  
rifugiate 
(refugees 
– f) 
profugo 
(refugee – 
m) 
profuga 
(refugee 
– f)  
profughe 
(refugees 
– f)  
pro-
fughi 
(refu-
gees – 
m) 
Sicu
rezz
a 
133 (23 
relevant) 
17 (0) 314  
(24 rel-
evant 
after 
exclud-
ing du-
plicates 
13(0) 91 (23 af-
ter exclud-
ing dupli-
cates) 
4 (1) 0(0) 1078 
(72 after 
exclud-
ing du-
pli-
cates) 
crim
inal 
24 (1) 1 (0) 27 (1) 1 (0) 4 (1) 2 (1) 0(0) 53 (1) 
ille-
gale 
11 (2) 3 (0) 20 (0) 0(0) 15 (2) 0(0) 8(0) 62(0) 
l Messaggero Veneto – Giornale del Friuli 
 
 Rifug-
iato 
Rifug-
iata 
Rifug-
iati 
Rifug-
iate 
Pro-
fugo 
Pro-
fuga 
Pro-
fughe 
pro-
fughi 
sicurezz
a 
232 (11) 38 (0) 867 (30) 8(0) 133 (6) 10 (0) 0(0) 2714 
(39) 
crimi-
nale 
44 (0) 3(0) 88(1) 0(0) 11(0) 1(0) 0(0) 138 
(4) 
illegale 41(0) 2(0) 81(2) 1(0) 11(0) 0(0) 0(0) 210 
(7) 
 
 
The software NVivo was used for the computer-assisted qualitative and 
quantitative content analysis. Relevant passages in the text were catego-
rised according to five main codes (‘Years’, ‘Actors speaking’, ‘Represen-
tations of migrants’, ‘Problems’, and ‘Solutions’) and 84 sub-codes. The 
use of NVivo allowed us to obtain descriptive statistics of the different 
codes and sub-codes: particularly, the number of references (that is, the 
number of text fragments within our sampled articles that have been coded 
with any code) provided us with insights into the recurrence of a certain 
theme in the press. The codes and sub-codes were also used to assist the 
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qualitative part of the analysis, the results of which are presented in the 
following section. 
 Our methodological approach has limitations that need to be acknowl-
edged, both in terms of the sources and the analytical approach adopted. 
First, media sources do not paint a true or complete picture of the social 
world: media representations necessarity consist of viewpoints that suc-
ceed in capturing the attention of the general public (Barak, 1994). Second, 
content analysis has the inherent limitation that it relies on the researchers’ 
own categorisations and interpretation of the meaning of a text; as ambi-
guity is particularly frequent in media discourses and in sensitive topics, 
the replicability requirement is not clarly met (Krippendorff, 1980). De-
spite these limitations, media resources and content analysis are widely 
used in social sciences research, as they provide researchers with precious 
and rich information and representations of the social world. 
 
 
Results and discussion 
 
Years 
 
The number of newspaper articles identified and analysed is overall rather 
scarce in the period of time stretching from 2008 to 2014, covering about 
one fifth of the total number of articles considered (N = 252). From 2015 
onward, by contrast, relevant articles started to increase significantly and 
reached the highest number (86 references in total) in 2016. Please note 
that for the year 2017, when fifty news articles were sampled, only news 
released until 31 May were taken into consideration, thus suggesting that 
in 2017 the number of virtually all relevant items will likely surpass the 
number of relevant news sampled in 2016.  
 
Actors speaking 
 
The voices of political actors dominate the press discourse on migrants 
(50,7%). In particular, the press tends to cover the opinions of mayors 
(21,3%) and local politicians (17,3%), in addition to the regional (6,4%) 
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and national (5,3%) politicians. The voices of criminal justice actors – in-
cluding the police (7,5%), the prefect (7,7%), the quaestor (3,3%) and 
judges (2.4%) – also substantially featured the local press debate on mi-
grants (20,9%). In addition, residents and citizens are also given a voice 
(11,9%). Groups that speak infrequently in the news are religious repre-
sentatives, groups and charities, who all try to get migrants integrated in 
the local communities (5,5%). Asylum seekers and refugees speak only in 
a very limited number of articles (1,75%) and, overall, less than their “vic-
tims” (or of the victims of crimes said to be committed by migrants) 
(2,6%). Experts’ opinions are virtually absent in the debate, as their voices 
appear in only one article where a university professor speaks, in line with 
Berry and colleagues (2015).  
 
Representations of migrants 
 
Migrants are mostly represented as criminals (45%) and bogus (15,7%). In 
a much limited number of articles, they are described as ‘illegal’ (‘clan-
destini’) (5,9%), dangerous as they allegedly carry highly infectious dis-
eases such as scabies (5,9%), and as terrorists (4,9%). Migrants are por-
trayed in positive terms, i.e. not as criminals but as people fleeing from 
civil wars, only in a very small minority of articles (6,4%). This partly con-
tradicts the results of the recent study carried out by Berry and colleagues 
(2015), which suggest that the Italian (national) press has presented nega-
tive frames about migrants along with more positive (mostly humanitarian) 
themes. This difference may have to do with the fact that in the study of 
Berry et al. (2015) the sampled newspapers were national and not local as 
in the present research, and that the local newspapers may tend to give 
more coverage to local events and to the messages of the most vocal local 
politicians, who often belong to right-wing political parties.  
 
Problems 
 
Both the two selected press outlets are consistent in describing the ‘refu-
gee’ problem as an ‘emergency’. The emergency situation is particularly 
sensationalised in the news published in Udine: the Italian region of Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, where Udine is situated, is commonly referred to in the 
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news as the ‘Lampedusa of the North’ (MV, 10 October 2015). This anal-
ogy is used to emphasise the high number of migrants who daily arrive in 
the region, either by crossing the Slovenian border or by being relocated 
by the central state (after landing in Lampedusa and reaching the Italian 
southern regions by sea). 
 In the substantial majority of the news (31,6%), national and local ref-
ugee hosting policies are questioned. For example, policies are problema-
tised and criticised because of the limited capacities of municipalities, 
which only can offer limited places in the (often old and unsuitable) allo-
cated reception centres to host asylum seekers and refugees, and of law 
enforcers to deal with the situation (10,6%). Hosting policies are also chal-
lenged because of the link between the arrival and acceptance of asylum 
seekers and the occurrence of social disorder and crime (5%) (e.g., “These 
migrant flows increase delinquency”, MV, 17 June 2015). The already 
(perceived) excessive number of asylum seekers and refugees in the local-
ity is also considered very problematic (4,3%), along with the limited in-
formation provided by municipalities to the citizens in relation to the num-
ber of hosted migrants and hosting modalities (1,6%), the overall perceived 
ineptitude of local politicians in dealing with the refugee crisis (0,7%), and 
the utilisation of perceived unsuitable or “special” spaces (e.g., with a cul-
tural or historic relevance) as reception centres (0,5%). In addition, na-
tional policies are criticised as they are considered too ‘open’ and allow 
too many asylum seekers and refugees to be hosted in the country (3,2%). 
Refugee policies are also attacked as they are said to be serving individ-
ual’s economic and political interests, at the expenses of the community 
(3,4%). 
 While the two press outlets offer a similar negative portrayal of national 
and local refugee hosting policies, they substantially differ in the way they 
frame the main problems associated with the arrival and stay of migrats in 
the local communities.  
 In Udine, for example, asylum seekers and refugees are mostly de-
scribed in terms of social and physical disorder (in short, as decay or, in 
Italian, ‘degrado’). Especially the unregistered or ‘irregular’ ones (such as 
the individuals who enter – or are trafficked in – the country through the 
Slovenian border, and ‘hang around’ without filing the asylum request by 
the competent authorities) are considered as a problem as they sleep rough 
in public parks and close by the train station (8,6%), simply hang about 
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(5,2%), engage in fights among each other (4,7%), and ‘pollute’ the areas 
they occupy (4,3%) (e.g., “They transformed the area into a latrine”, MV, 
31 December 2016). The emphasis on the link between migrants and phys-
ical disorder is well exemplified in the following fragment: “They do not 
annoy us, but they scare us and make [the area] dirty” (MV, 24 May 2015). 
More in general, the presence of migrants seems to alarm people as refu-
gees and asylum seekers are said to adopt uncivil behaviour:  
 “There are reported fights, gatherings of refugees under the covered 
walkway and in front of the shop windows, and most of all drug dealing in 
the open-air. [. . .] All this has created a strong sense of fear. People feel 
impotent in front of others’ rudeness. [. . .] This is a terrible defeat of [our] 
system of civilisation, law and order” (MV, 30 December 2016). 
 The representations of asylum seekers and refugees in Padova vary sub-
stantially, as they are mostly portrayed as criminals or as bogus. In many 
of the news, for example, asylum seekers and refugees are considered as 
‘fake’ (MP, 9 August 2008): they are described as economic migrants, who 
are given more than what ‘the others’ – meaning the legitimate Italian cit-
izens who pay taxes – get from the State. These representations are well 
exemplified in the fragment below, which describes migrants as fake, ille-
gal, and welfare scroungers:  
 
“The welcoming of alleged asylum-seekers is up to those who are ac-
complices of this invasion, and who are at the Government. I perceive 
my role [as mayor, a.n.] as a family man and, as such, I need to defend 
my family and I won’t use part of the scarce resources that the [national] 
Government leaves on our territory to support the illegal migrants who, 
according to Alfano and Renzi [national level politicians, a.n.], should 
make out a living on the shoulders and at the risk of our community. 
The pensioners and the pre-retired people trapped by the pension re-
form, the young couples, the unemployed, all the victims of the eco-
nomic crisis and of three unelected governments, they all deserve secu-
rity and respect” (MP, 15 April 2015). 
  
When depicted as criminals (21% in total), migrants are mostly associated 
with drug dealing (6,3%), theft (2,1%), and, especially, with violence and 
sexual assault (7,5%), and sexual harassment (4,3%). When the press co-
vers news on sexual harassment and assault (reporting a few episodes that 
have occurred in Padova), the victims (who are women) speak (e.g., “We 
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have been left alone at the mercy of a pervert”, MP, 24 March 2017). Nar-
ratives on the importance of protecting women (“we see scared and worried 
women, who need to be listened to and protected”, MP, 13 March 2017) 
and children (“But if they invade our streets and wander around to fill their 
time, it is difficult not to be worried. I have a daughter who does sport and 
she will have to spend time in public places, such as in the sports field”, 
MP, 14 September 2016; “I am scared for my two little sisters”, MP, 17 
October 2015) are very typical.  
 In both press outlets, moreover, the presence of migrants is said to un-
dermine the perceptions of safety of citizens (11%), who are “exasperated” 
(MV, 30 December 2016; MP, 14 September 2008) and “afraid” (MV, 1 
October 2015; MP, 19 December 2016). In Padova, fears are sensational-
ised through the use of emotionally-laden adjectives such as feeling “under 
siege” (MP, 2 October. 2016), “angry and enraged” (MP, 10 August 2008), 
or “terrified” (MP, 26 September 2011). 
 Residents in both cities also describe urban neighbourhoods as becom-
ing “of others” – not belonging to “them” anymore (4,1%). Consider, for 
instance, the following examples: “We are afraid to go out. We do not feel 
any longer masters in our own house”, MV, 9 January 2017; “There is an 
attempt of these gangs of drug dealers, mostly Tunisians with residency 
permits in their pockets, to take control of some neighbourhoods at night, 
intimidating and frightening the citizens”, MP, 26 September 2011; “The 
‘district’ of asylum-seekers”, MP, 25 March 2017; “The piazzas now are 
scary” MP, 25 June 2011; “They are invading our streets”, MP, 14 Sep-
tember 2016; “We do not longer feel safe in our own homes”, MP, 2 Oc-
tober 2016. This is said to have a negative impact especially on women and 
children: “The children can no longer play in the park as it became drug 
dealers’ territory. The girls are harassed, denigrated or insulted when they 
pass by” (MV, 30 December 2016); “‘They are all men, we – the women 
– do not feel safe’, said the mums” (MV, 31 May 2015). 
 Only in a limited number of press news, the problem is associated with 
terrorism (2.1%) – as a potential crime committed by migrants – and with 
trafficking in human beings (2.1%) – and the migrants framed as victims.  
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Solutions 
 
Mostly, the solutions that have been offered in the press in relation to the 
problem of migrants have to do with the enhanced presence of police of-
ficers, and even the army, on the streets (55,9%). In doing so, a sensation-
alistic and war-type rhetoric is used, as shown for instance by the following 
fragments: 
 
“We are barricaded in our houses, let the army intervene” (MV, 5 Jan-
uary 2017);  
“The station area is secured by dozens of squads” (MV, 15 August 
2016); 
“It is now war on drug dealing” (MP, 8 September 2015); 
“Security emergency. The city has to be militarised” (MP, 28 December 
2014). 
 
Examples of successful and praised law enforcement actions are also of-
fered by the news (31,9%): 
 
“The questura, since a long time, was organising ad-hoc services in the 
station area, with an impressive deployment of manpower. Even more: 
the questor Claudio Cracovia asked for, and obtained, the intervention 
of the [. . .] rapid response unit from the Padova police, with agents 
specialised in public order services, on the streets” (MV, 6 September 
2016). 
“The other night, 40 law enforcement officers from the questura have 
hoovered up the hotspots of the city, and they brought 18 people to the 
questura, including 13 Tunisians, who are considered [as an ethnic 
group, a.n.] among the most dangerous ones as regards to drug dealing, 
thefts, and violence” (MP, 1 October 2011). 
 
Typical solutions also include the arrest and conviction of ‘criminal’ mi-
grants (6,7%), the adoption of punitive local regulations entrusting the po-
lice with sanctioning powers (6,2%), the shutting down of public spaces 
like subways and parks (e.g., “The green areas are for the families, not for 
illegal migrants”, MP, 24 September 2015) and private premises unsuitable 
for hosting migrants (5,3%), and the ejection and removal of ‘bogus’ and 
‘illegal’ migrants (4%). In seven articles (1,7%), moreover, the emphasis 
is placed on the need to tighten the links between the citizens, the police 
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and the municipality, with a view to establishing a new ‘partnership in se-
curity’ (so-called ‘sicurezza partecipata’, MP, 19 Dec. 2015). Although 
these solutions are most common for Padova, they also feature in the press 
debate in Udine.  
 Responses to the problem of hosting an increasing number of migrants 
at the local level are the organisation of protests and marches (5,3%), and 
the transfer of migrants to other locations, including smaller towns (2,4%) 
and other EU countries (3,8%). Migrants are also to be hosted in dismissed 
army bases and other allocated places that ought to be refurbished and to 
comply with health and safety standards (4%), in buildings owned by the 
church or charities (1,2%), and in privately owned apartments (1%). Also 
the need for a greater EU intervention (1,4%) and better national coordina-
tion (1,4%) are mentioned as solutions.   
 Other solutions, which have mostly been offered in relation to the mi-
gration problem in Udine, are also linked to the redesign and revitalisation 
of certain city areas (10,8%). Among these measures, there are the instal-
lation of CCTV cameras (4,3%), the improvement of the street lightning 
during the night (2,9%), the amelioration of the street cleaning and of the 
urban architecture (2,2%), and neighbourhood regeneration (1,4%).  
 Alongside criminal justice and administrative interventions, therefore, 
the crime prevention policies promoted in the press news seems to be 
rooted in situational (Clarke, 1983) and environmental (Newman, 1972; 
Sorensen et al., 1995) crime prevention. While the former are significantly 
present in both cities, the latter seems to be only present in Udine, a left-
wing territory.  
 Community (Hope, 1995) crime prevention approaches, including edu-
cation, integration and job opportunities for migrants, and the organisation 
of campaigns to sensitise citizens towards accepting and integrating mi-
grants, are identified as solutions only in a minority of articles (5,7%). Per-
haps unsurprisingly, considering who speaks in the news and the content 
of their messages, developmental crime prevention approaches (Tremblay 
and Craig, 1995), such as interventions for child migrants or second-gen-
eration asylum-seekers, are never addressed in the news.  
 Other solutions include the carrying out of health checks on asylum 
seekers and undocumented migrants (2,4%), and the fastening of the pro-
cedures that award them the refugee status (1,7%).  
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Concluding thoughts  
 
The ‘problem’ of migrants in Italy has been constructed, both at the na-
tional and local levels, as a security problem and has been tackled with 
public order and ‘crimmigration’ measures. National legislations have 
been passed by both centre-right and centre-left coalitions mirroring the 
popular saying among politicians that “the issue of security is neither [a 
task] of the left nor of the right” (see Pighi, 2014). Security is, in fact, a 
very appealing topic that helps politicians – of any political colour – to tap 
into people’s fears and anxieties and gain political consensus. For example, 
as explained by Colombo (2013), tough ‘crimmigration’ measures in Italy 
have been passed by both centre-right and centre-left coalitions. Similarly, 
enhanced security powers to local authorities have been introduced 
(through the so-called ‘Security Package’ mentioned above) by a centre-
right coalition, and have been revamped in 2017 by a law decree (the ‘Min-
niti’ Decree) of the centre-left government run by PD, and more recently 
by a ‘security decree’ of the current populist government (a coalition be-
tween the 5 Star Movement and the right-wing party Northern League). 
The use of the banner of security as an electoral tool to gain political con-
sensus has been pursued both by left- and right-wing political parties not 
only at the national level. At the local level, local authorities have, in prac-
tice, tended to enforce crimmigration measures, and to exercise (illegiti-
mate) public order powers, to ultimately please the fearful electorate and 
maintain or gain political support.8 
 As emerges from our results, local politicians and law enforcers in 
Udine and Padova, the cities considered in this study and run by centre-left 
and right-wing (Northern League) political parties respectively, have con-
                                                          
8  There are, of course, a few exceptions, for instance cases where people’s fears 
have been addressed by local authorities with integration and community-led 
programmes rather than with more law enforcement. In Riace, a town in the 
southern region of Calabria, for example, the mayor Mimmo Lucano has in-
troduced a welcoming system for migrants based on their integration in the 
community. However, with a contested decision occurring in a very difficult 
and polarized political contest, the mayor has been arrested in early October 
2018 and charged with aiding and abetting illegal immigration. 
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structed the ‘problems’ of migrants in the local press in only slightly dif-
ferent terms: they have described them as disorderly, in Udine, and as crim-
inal and bogus, in Padova – where a more sensationalistic and rhetoric tone 
has generally been used, also reflecting the political rhetoric of the populist 
party Northern League running the city. This notwithstanding, they have 
mainly proposed the same set of solutions: more law enforcement, includ-
ing the deployment of the army. Since the study found that the local press 
tends mostly to cover the messages of local politicians and promote their 
problem-framing and solutions, its results seem to resonate the findings of 
a recent study of the representations of unauthorised migrants in the Dutch 
press, which has suggested that the press, rather than framing ‘problems’ 
and setting agendas for the policy-maker, tend to reflect and follow politi-
cal debates fuelled by domestic politicians (Brower et al., 2017).   
 We do not want in any way to downplay the problems that many Italian 
municipalities are currently facing when it comes to hosting (documented 
or undocumented) migrants in their territories, which are severe consider-
ing the number of migrants that daily arrive in Italy, both by sea and via 
land. In addition, very few cases of violent and sexual attacks committed 
by migrants against Italians have actually happened, particularly in Pa-
dova. However, such cases have been exploited by local politicians in the 
press and have been exaggerated/amplified, thus contributing to fuelling 
people’s fears9 and to constructing migrants as the ‘dangerous other’. The 
local press construction of migrants as a security problem is worrying es-
pecially in light of the 2017 ‘Minniti’ Decree, which allows municipalities 
to sanction individual’s behaviour when it is deemed to impair the ‘deco-
rum’, ‘urban liveability’ and the “peace and quiet of residents”, and to ban 
people from certain city areas when their behaviour “impairs the access 
and use of those areas” by others (see above in the Background section).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
 Clearly, this Decree is based on very vague notions such as, ‘decorum’, 
‘liveability’, ‘peace and quiet’, impairment to ‘access and use’ of city 
spaces by others, whose meaning is to be given by local authorities and 
can, in practice, be informed by arbitium (or, as already pointed out by the 
Constitutional Court in 2011, by not clearly pre-determined criteria valid 
                                                          
9  As pointed out by Lane and Meeker (2003), white people’s fears are mostly 
affected by newspaper reporting (rather than TV viewing, which has been 
found to have no effect on fear of crime by Chadee and Ditton, 2005).    
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for all municipalities that ensure legal certainty). In essence, the simple 
presence of unwanted migrants in the streets, which may be considered 
alarming for some (although not actually causing any harm to people in an 
overwhelmingly majority of cases) can be penalised by local actors 
through public order and crimmigration measures, which may involve ad-
ministrative sanctions as well as detention (especially in the case of undoc-
umented migrants). This potentially leads to a net widening effect (Cohen, 
1985), as certain individuals – for them belonging to a certain social group 
rather than for them committing (deviant or) criminal acts – are caught and 
retained in the net of the criminal justice system.  
 The local use of punitive measures to criminalise the (disorderly or 
criminal) migrant ‘other’ may be facilitated by the press coverage of the 
messages of politicians and law enforcers, who, with their negative por-
trayal of migrants, dominate the local press news as a kind of ‘deviance-
defining élite’ (Erickson et al. in Jewkes, 2015). A very limited coverage 
is given, by contrast, to the voices of third sector associations, charities and 
religious groups, who can pass positive messages on migrants and exam-
ples of integration, and to the opinion of criminology and criminal justice 
experts, who can contribute to reframing the popular media constructions 
of the ‘problem’ and its solutions. Overall, media give very rigid represen-
tations of crimes committed by migrants, which is in line with previous 
research on Greek media (Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2013). Third 
sector associations and experts – in an effort to enhance the presence of 
their views in the local press and ensure a greater pluralism in the content 
of media news – should aim at gaining access to the local press (and, more 
broadly, to the local media) and regularly make their voice heard on locally 
relevant news involving migrants. In particular, criminology and criminal 
justice experts willing to act as ‘public criminologists’ may, for example, 
benefit from the writings on ‘newsmaking’ (Barak, 1988, 2007) and public 
criminologies (see, e.g., Loader and Sparks, 2010; Turner, 2013; Crépault, 
2017), which may help them to better communicate through media outlets 
and, ultimately, to ‘correct’ biased or distorted images of ‘criminal’ groups. 
A more active newsmaking role of criminologist is desired especially con-
sidering the media interest in – and concern about –migration, which seems 
to be ever-growing (Spencer, 2008) and unlikely to decrease in the next 
years. This is the more important in view of the shared poor understanding 
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of the issue by key stakeholders, including the (national and local) govern-
ment(s), law enforcers and the media (Van Duyne, 2004a, 2004b).  
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